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Wouldn't You Like To Be an Expert, Too?
Michael Ariens
St. Mary's University School of Law
It was once an open secret among lawyers that finding an expert to
testify in your client's behalf was one of the easiest aspects of litigating. Law-
yers not in possession of private lists of experts easily located persons willing
and able to sell their expertise in the back pages of the state bar journal, in
advertisements in legal newspapers, and in direct mail appeals from companies
whose business is selling expertise. One consequence was that the phrase "a
battle of the experts" came to be applied to a number of different types of law-
suits, and people began referring to both lawyers and experts as "hired guns".
Another consequence was a professional cynicism about the virtue (classical, not
instrumental) of experts.
My sense is that today's public is aware of this open secret among
lawyers. Unlike many of my colleagues, who are cynical on this point, howev-
er, I remain convinced that the public, for the most part, accepts the authority
of experts. When Dennis Barrie, the curator at the Contemporary Arts Center
in Cincinnati, was charged several years ago with obscenity for displaying the
photographs of Robert Mapplethorpe, the jury's ignorance of modern art was
perceived as a severe blow to Barrie's chances. The jury nevertheless acquitted
him because, according to some members of the jury, they deferred to the opin-
ions of defense experts who testified that Mapplethorpe's work was not legally
obscene.' When Eileen Franklin-Lipsker suddenly recalled the death twenty
years before of her girlfriend Susan Nason at the hands of Eileen's father,
George Franklin Sr., expert testimony regarding the authenticity of recovered
memory syndrome was crucial to Franklin's murder conviction. In addition,
jurors (and judges) in a number of states heard the testimony of anthropologist
Louise Robbins, who claimed that footprints were unique and that she was
uniquely qualified to identify their maker. This testimony aided the conviction
of at least 11 criminal defendants. It is now viewed as "nonsense," and a cause
of several wrongful convictions.
The principal reason lawyers find it is easy to hire an expert to render
an opinion favoring the client's position (other than the crass economic reason
that demand may create supply) is that the Federal Rules of Evidence, enacted
in 1975 and adapted by at least 34 states, make it easy to qualify a witness as an
expert. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 simply requires the witness to have
"specialized knowledge" which will "assist" the trier of fact.4 Rule 702 states
that this specialized knowledge can be gained through "knowledge, skill, expe-
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rience, training, or education," and anyone possessing any one of those criteria
may, unlike any other witness, give the trier of fact an opinion about what
happened. For lawyers, then, finding and qualifying an expert is not an oner-
ous chore. The more difficult chore is persuading the trier of fact that the
expert's testimony should be believed.
The principal reason lawyers are able to persuade the trier of fact (either
the jury, or, in a case in which a jury is neither demanded nor permitted, the
judge) of the "reality" of the expert's testimony is that we live in a bureaucratic
and therapeutic state. The bureaucratic state exalts expertise over common
wisdom, which becomes myth or folklore. A complex society demands higher-
order solutions, and those solutions are found in the domain of a "Brains Trust"
or other group of experts. The therapeutic state rationalizes the horrific and
inconceivable, and presents the hope of turning the maladjusted into the well-
adjusted.
Both the bureaucratic state and the therapeutic state enmesh popular
culture. From Fred Friendly's rather highbrow efforts on PBS to bring experts
in disparate fields together to solve, for example, the "problem" of free speech
in a diverse society, to CNN's "Crossfire" or "The Larry King Show" to talk
radio to the daily fare on Oprah, Phil, Geraldo, Sally and their imitators,
popular culture radiates the language of therapy and expertise.
Just as the American legal system allows almost anyone to sue for
almost anything, it permits almost anyone claiming expertise to testify as an
expert. I was not surprised that lawyers from a very large Chicago law firm5
would attempt to obtain favorable testimony from an expert in a case in which
"a great deal was at stake."' I was not surprised that the judge initially ruled
against admitting Dr. Marsden's testimony on the cultural use of the phrase
"drive-in restaurant," for the issue probably was what the parties understood
was meant by "drive-in restaurant," rather than the popular culture definition
of that phrase. (It is not true, as Dr. Marsden suggests, that fixing the cultural
meaning of particular terms and concepts fixes the legal meaning of those terms
and concepts. However, the particularized information may be helpful to
determining the likely meaning of the parties, and that's all the rules of evi-
dence require.) I was not surprised when the judge later reversed himself, for
judges often do that when trying cases without juries. (They tend to think out
loud rather than to themselves.) Finally, I was not surprised that the judge dis-
claimed any reliance on Dr. Marsden's testimony, because this silences any
claim on appeal that the judge erroneously relied on inadmissible testimony,
and thus insulates the judge's decision from appellate review. I was only
surprised that the judge initially ruled that Dr. Marsden was not an expert; as
I noted above, in all but the most hopeless cases, the parties are quite capable
of finding witnesses who meet the slender evidentiary definition of an expert.
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(And Dr. Marsden possessed much more expertise than many others qualified
as experts.) But judges, no matter how they comport themselves on the bench,
are human beings capable of making (and, in this case, rectifying) their mis-
takes.
It is difficult to draw any particular lessons from the "popular culture
meets the law" story told by Dr. Marsden. For those who are not lawyers, it
may be interesting to note the (relative) ease by which one is denominated an
expert. The readers of this commentary, most of whom, like me, make a living
by selling their knowledge, can gain comfort in the fact that they too may be
able to redistribute some wealth from a large, multinational corporation to a
(more deserving?) member of the knowledge class. As for "first times," it might
be expected that the event was anticlimactic.
A more interesting (to me) interplay of popular culture and law is the
impact of popular culture on the operation of the law.' We are a society
saturated by law. Novels about law by John Grisham, Scott Turow and oth-
er have sold millions of copies. Television inundates viewers with stories of
law. Police procedurals invoking the Miranda warnings ("You have the right
to remain silent . . . ."), docudramas telescoping true crime stories like the trial
of the Menendez brothers, and obviously fictionalized series like "Law & Or-
der" or "L.A. Law" offering courtroom dramas give the public a particular view
of the role of law in our society. The particular view is often contradictory,
suggesting on the one hand that law impedes the search for justice (like legal
"technicalities" freeing the guilty criminal defendant) and that lawyers use dirty
tricks (or the adversary system, which may mean the same thing) to thwart just
results but also suggesting on the other that our devotion to the rule of law
separates us from other countries and that individual lawyers, driven by a thirst
for justice, wield the sword of law to champion just causes. Because the United
States, unlike any other country in the world, relies on the collective judgments
of non-expert jurors (consisting of a cross-section of much, although not all, of
the public) to decide who wins and who loses, the view of law channelled to
most homes most nights affects not just our perceptions of law, lawyers and
justice, but the course of law, the conduct of lawyers and the impact of justice.
In this respect, the popular portrayal of laws and legal actors affects what
counts in the "discipline" of law. (On more than once occasion, lawyers have
apologized to the members of the jury for not providing them an "L.A. Law"-
type of case or courtroom demeanor.) This interplay offers a wonderful oppor-
tunity for legal academics and popular culture academics to use the skills of
their respective disciplines for fruitful interdisciplinary research.
If popular culture studies is to be defended on the basis of its instrumen-
tal value (and as an academic I'm not enamored of that kind of defense), I
suggest that this value is not demonstrated by the events leading to Dr. Mars-
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den's research and testimony. The "usefulness" of popular culture studies in
law lies less in the ammunition it gives highly paid lawyers for one large corpo-
ration against lawyers for another large corporation than in the study of the
contradictory ways in which law is portrayed in popular culture. We may gain
some insights about visions of law and democracy in our society from the
relation of portrayals of heroic lawyers like Atticus Finch in To Kill A Mocking-
bird, or of jurors in the play (and teleplay) Twelve Angry Men, to the work of
the Warren Court, or from the corruption (or corruptibility) of lawyers in the
recent novels of John Grisham. This is above-ground archeology at its best.
Michael Kammen's fascinating cultural history of the Constitution, A Machine
That Would Go of Itself, describing "the place of the Constitution in the public
consciousness and symbolic life of the American people,"' offers an approach
popular culture studies would do well to emulate. In this way, popular culture
studies is not only not "non-orthodox," but the most orthodox of academic
studies.
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